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Abstract
Dynamic spectrum sharing is a promising technology to improve spectrum utilization in the
future wireless networks. The flexible spectrum management provides new opportunities for li-
censed primary user and unlicensed secondary users to reallocate the spectrum resource efficiently.
In this paper, we present an oligopoly pricing framework for dynamic spectrum allocation in which
the primary users sell excessive spectrum to the secondary users for monetary return. We present
two approaches, the strict constraints (type-I) and the QoS penalty (type-II), to model the real-
istic situation that the primary users have limited capacities. In the oligopoly model with strict
constraints, we propose a low-complexity searching method to obtain the Nash Equilibrium and
prove its uniqueness. When reduced to a duopoly game, we analytically show the interesting gaps
in the leader-follower pricing strategy. In the QoS penalty based oligopoly model, a novel variable
transformation method is developed to derive the unique Nash Equilibrium. When the market
information is limited, we provide three myopically optimal algorithms “StrictBEST”, “StrictBR”
and “QoSBEST” that enable price adjustment for duopoly primary users based on the Best Re-
sponse Function (BRF) and the bounded rationality (BR) principles. Numerical results validate
the effectiveness of our analysis and demonstrate the fast convergence of “StrictBEST” as well
as “QoSBEST” to the Nash Equilibrium. For the “StrictBR” algorithm, we reveal the chaotic
behaviors of dynamic price adaptation in response to the learning rates.
Key words: Dynamic Spectrum Sharing, Oligopoly Pricing, Cognitive Radio, Nash Equilibrium,
Best Response Function, Bounded Rationality, Bifurcation and Chaos.
1. Introduction
Wireless spectrum has become the scarcest resource due to the dramatic development of mobile
telecommunication industry in the last decades. However, recent studies by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) show that traditional fixed allocation policy results in very low effi-
ciency in radio spectrum utilization. The increasing spectrum demand, together with the resource
scarcity, gives rise to the development of cognitive radio networks that enable dynamic spectrum
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access. Within a dynamic spectrum access system, radio spectrum resources are allocated by agile
management schemes in terms of spectrum market among the unlicensed (i.e., secondary) users and
the licensed (i.e., primary) users [3]. When the possessed spectrum is not fully utilized, a primary
user has an opportunity to sell the excessive spectrum to the secondary users for monetary payoff.
This is also referred to as spectrum trading mechanism in [2] which involves spectrum selling and
purchasing processes. Therefore, it is natural to consider the spectrum allocation in the perspective
of economic models and market strategies.
In such an emerging network scenario, multiple primary users coexist in the same geographical
site and compete for the access or the purchase of secondary users equipped with cognitive radios.
Hence, an important problem for the spectrum trading is how the primary users set prices of per-
unit spectrum in a competitive market. For example, if a primary user sets a very low price, it
might result in the loss of revenue (or profit). On the contrary, if the price is set too expensive,
the secondary users are inclined to purchase from other spectrum holders. Niyato et.al [2] initially
introduce the oligopoly pricing theory to characterize the interactions between the spectrum abun-
dant side (primary users) and the demanding side (secondary users). In the oligopoly spectrum
market, a commonly used quadratic utility is adopted to quantify the spectrum demand of the
secondary service, and each primary user aims to maximize the individual profit. In [3], Jia and
Zhang study the competitions and dynamics of spectrum allocation in a duopoly market via a non-
cooperative two-stage game. However, authors in [2] do not consider an important feature that a
primary user usually has limited capacity to lease. Authors in [3] mainly focus on the situation
that both two wireless service providers have limited spectrum capacities in the price competition
stage. In fact, the price competition in a more general oligopoly game is rather difficult to be
analyzed when the constraints of spectrum capacity are incorporated.
In this paper, we investigate the competitive pricing of a general oligopoly spectrum game.
Distinguished from previous work, our study concentrates on the capacity-constrained pricing that
is quite common to the primary users. To characterize the limitation in leasing spectrum resource,
we employ two approaches: the strict constraints (type-I) and the QoS penalty functions (type-II).
In the market model with type-I constraints, each primary user has a certain spectrum bound
so that it might not be able to provide the best spectrum demand. We address the following
challenging issues: a) is there a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE ) in such a capacity-constrained
spectrum game? b) if YES, how to find the NE efficiently? c) especially in duopoly games,
what are the impacts of capacity constrains on the NE s and the system dynamics? In the type-
II market model, the capacity constraint of a primary user is absorbed in the utility as a barrier
penalty function. This corresponds to the scenario that the leased spectrum is transferred from the
existing services of primary users. They offer spectrum for monetary return, however, at the cost of
QoS decrease of primary services. Here, we model the QoS of a primary service as a function of the
queueing delay. Generally, explicit solution does not exist in such an oligopoly spectrum allocation
game. We present a novel method to discover the NE and to prove its uniqueness. Consider the
fact that a primary user usually has no knowledge of the utilities and the price-demand functions of
its opponents, we develop a set of price adjustment algorithms based on the best response dynamics
and the bounded rationality principles.
To summarize, our contributions are:
• We formulate two oligopoly market models to characterize the capacity limitations: the strict
constraints (type-I) and the QoS based penalty functions (type-II). Given the above market
models, the primary users compete for revenue or utility maximization by deciding the prices
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of per-unit spectrum.
• In the type-I model, we propose a novel searching method to find a Nash Equilibrium and
prove its uniqueness. Interestingly, we find the revenue gaps in the duopoly Stackelberg game
with type-I constraints.
• We present two algorithms, StrictBEST and StrictBR, to adjust prices dynamically based
on the best response dynamics and the bounded rationality when the market information is
limited.
• In the type-II model, we present an interesting variable transformation method to derive the
Nash Equilibrium and prove its uniqueness. The QoSBEST algorithm is proposed to perform
spectrum pricing based on the best response dynamics.
• We demonstrate the nonlinear dynamic behaviors in the StrictBR algorithm when the learn-
ing rates vary.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the system models of
capacity-constrained spectrum market. In section 3 and 4, we analyze the NE s of the noncoop-
erative oligopoly market with type-I and type-II constrains respectively. Section 5 evaluates the
analysis and performance of proposed schemes. We present an overview of related work in section
6 and conclude in section 7.
2. System Model
In this section, we present mathematical models to characterize the dynamic spectrum alloca-
tion in cognitive radio networks. To capture the realistic spectrum market, two types of capacity
constraints are incorporated.
2.1. Agile Spectrum Market
We consider the cognitive radio network where multiple primary users (PUs) or wireless service
providers (WSPs) compete for a shared pool of secondary users. The secondary users are the
static/mobile devices equipped with cognitive radio technologies. The primary users are the in-
frastructure based wireless operators or the licensed spectrum holders. They are usually treated as
the spectrum brokers that lease the unused frequency to the secondary users for monetary payoff.
We show the structure of a spectrum market in Fig.1 with a number of primary users and the
common secondary users. In this spectrum market, the demands of secondary users depend on the
prices of per-unit spectrum. Each primary user chooses its own price to compete for the secondary
users’ subscription.
2.2. Secondary Users
We characterize the spectrum demands of secondary users in the oligopoly market. Define
N = {1, 2, · · · , N} as the set of primary users. Let pi be the price of the i
th primary user. Denote
qi to be the quantity of spectrum that secondary users buy from the i
th primary user. We define
the utility of an average secondary user as a quadratic and concave function [1][2]:
u(q) =
N∑
i=1
αiqi −
1
2
( N∑
i=1
βiq
2
i + 2µ
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
qiqj
)
−
N∑
i=1
piqi, (1)
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Figure 1: Spectrum Market Structure
where αi, βi are positive constants for all i ∈ N . Here, αi denotes the spectral efficiency of
wireless transmission by a secondary user using the frequency owned by the ith primary user [2].
The spectral efficiencies of primary users can be the same, or different, depending on their center
frequencies. For instance, if the center frequency of the ith primary user is high, secondary users
may experience large path loss (or low spectral efficiency equivalently) when purchasing spectrum
from this primary user. Similar to previous work, we also take the spectrum substitutability into
account via the parameter µ. If µ is 0, a secondary user cannot switch among the primary users.
When 0 < µ < βi, a secondary user can switch among the primary users depending on the spectral
efficiency and the price of per-unit spectrum. For example, if one primary user increases its price
of per-unit of spectrum, some of the secondary users may buy spectrum from other primary users,
and vice versa. When αi = α and βi = µ for all i ∈ N , the spectra of primary users are perfectly
substitutive for secondary users. Taking the first-order derivative of the utility function with respect
to qi and letting it be 0, we obtain the purchase price of secondary users from the i
th primary user:
pi = αi − βiqi − µ
∑
j 6=i
qj, ∀i, j ∈ N . (2)
The concave function in Eqn.(1) characterizes user satisfaction in terms of the purchased spectrum.
In order to guarantee the concavity of utility function, its Jacobian matrix should be negative
definite, that is,
∂u(q)
∂q
= −T = −


β1 µ . . . µ
µ β2 . . . µ
...
...
. . .
...
µ µ . . . βN

 < 0, (3)
where T denotes the above matrix. Note that the concavity of utility function is equivalent to
the positive definiteness of T. Here, we present a necessary condition in Lemma 1 to set market
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parameters.
Lemma 1. The matrix T is positive definite if the market parameters has βi > µ > 0 for all
i ∈ N .
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
For the primary users, their strategies are to set prices of per-unit spectrum in the oligopoly
market. Thus, the demand function can be expressed as the following:
q =


β1 µ . . . µ
µ β2 . . . µ
...
...
. . .
...
µ µ . . . βN


−1
·




α1
α2
...
αN

− p

 (4)
where p is the price vector and q is the spectrum demand vector. Given the price vector, the
spectrum demand of primary user i is rewritten by:
qi = fi(p) = ai − bipi +
∑
j 6=i
cijpj, ∀i, j ∈ N , (5)
where bi as well as cij are variables computed through Eqn.(4) and ai = αibi −
∑
j 6=i cijαj . Es-
pecially, cij = cji and cii = −bi due to the symmetry of convert matrix. The market parameters
transformed from Eqn.(4) satisfy the following property,
Lemma 2. The parameters that characterize demand-price function in Eqn.(5), i.e. bi and cij
(i 6= j), are positive, given the conditions βi > µ > 0 for all i, j ∈ N .
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
In the market model, if the spectral efficiencies (i.e. αi,∀i ∈ N ) are close to each other, one can
guarantee the positivity of ai by choosing βi and µ appropriately. We give an example of spectrum
market with only two primary users. The utility function results in linear inverse demand functions
p1 = α1 − β1q1 − µq2, (6)
p2 = α2 − β2q2 − µq1. (7)
The relationship between prices and demands can be represented by an alternative form:
q1 = f1(p) = a1 − b1p1 + cp2, (8)
q2 = f2(p) = a2 − b2p2 + cp1. (9)
According to Eqn.(4), ai and bi are calculated by: ai = (αiβj−αjµ)/(β1β2−µ
2), bi = βj/(β1β2−µ
2)
and c = µ/(β1β2 − µ
2) for i 6= j, (i, j ∈ {1, 2}). To ensure the positivity of prices and demands,
there have β1β2 > µ
2 and αiβj > αjµ for i, j = 1 or 2.
2.3. Primary Users and Bertrand Game Model
The spectra leased by primary users are either unused or transferred from existing applications.
The revenue of the ith primary user is a product of the leased spectrum qi and the price pi. In
practical cognitive radio networks, the primary users cannot always satisfy the demands of the
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spectrum market. Hence, capacity constraints should be taken into consideration when the primary
users set the prices. In this paper, we formulate the oligopoly price competition as a Bertrand game.
The players are the primary users, and the strategy of a primary user is the price of unit spectrum.
Denote pii to be the payoff (or utility) of the primary user i that could be either the revenue or the
profit. Let Wi be the spectrum size of the i
th primary user and Bi be the traffic loads of primary
services. The spectrum efficiency, r
(p)
i , is defined as the transmission rate per-unit spectrum for the
ith primary service. The available spectrum for sale at player i is expressed as qai =Wi −Bi/r
(p)
i .
We incorporate the capacity constraints into the primary users’ payoff via two approaches:
• Type-I Strict Capacity Constraints: The primary users aim to maximize their monetary
revenues under the constraints of capacities. The local optimization model of the ith primary
user is expressed as:
maximize pii(pi,p−i) = pi ·min{fi(p), q
a
i }, (10)
subject to pi > 0, ∀i ∈ N , (11)
where p−i is the price vector excluding pi.
• Type-II QoS Penalty Functions: An alternative approach is to translate the capacity con-
straints as the barrier penalty functions to the revenues. Assume that the traffic pattern of a
primary user is an i.d.d. poisson arrival process. The average queuing delay of a packet can
be approximated by Bi
r
p
i (Wi−qi)−Bi
, which is adopted to reflect the quality of primary services.
Therefore, the utility maximization of a primary user can be expressed as:
maximize pii(pi,p−i) = pimin{fi(p), q
a
i } − θ log
Bi/r
(p)
i
qai −min{fi(p), q
a
i }
(12)
subject to pi > 0, ∀i ∈ N , (13)
where the positive variable θ is the weight of the lognormal M/M/1 queuing delay.
Note that the capacity constraints in type-II have different implication from that in type-
I. There might have multiple equilibrium points in the type-II model. Therefore, the infeasible
solutions are excluded if they are outside of the capacity bounds. In the Bertrand game, the Nash
Equilibrium is a vector of spectrum prices that no player can increase its payoff by changing its
price unilaterally.
3. Noncooperative Game with Type-I Capacity Constraints
In this section, we first present the static game and the leader-follower game with Type-I
capacity constraints, by assuming the availability of full market information of primary users.
Furthermore, a dynamic game is formulated to characterize the interactions of price competition
when such information is not available.
3.1. Static Duopoly Game
We commence the analysis by considering a duopoly spectrum market with two primary users,
and then extend to a more general scenario. In the duopoly game, the NE price of a player is
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obtained by assuming that the other player also chooses the best strategy. However, the “best”
strategies of primary users are different in situations whether the spectrum capacities are sufficient
or not. Since there are two primary users, the competitive pricing can be subdivided into four
cases. Very recently, authors have analyzed the static games of these four cases and proved the
existence of NE in [3]. Their analysis is based on graphical interpretation, which might be difficult
to extend to a more general oligopoly game. Inspired by their work, we adopt a slightly different
way to study the existence of NE in this section. In comparison with [3], the only difference is
the simplicity of analysis in this subsection. Later on, our method will be extended to prove the
existence of unique NE in a spectrum game with more than two primary users.
For the ith primary user, it decides the price pi so as to maximize its revenue [3]
max pi ·min{q
a
i , ai − bipi + cpj}, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}. (14)
We first investigate the Nash Equilibrium when the available spectra are sufficient for both primary
users (PUs). The revenues of PU1 and PU2 can be written as:
pi1(p) = −b1(p1 −
a1 + cp2
2b1
)2 +
(a1 + cp2)
2
4b1
, (15)
pi2(p) = −b2(p2 −
a2 + cp1
2b2
)2 +
(a2 + cp1)
2
4b2
. (16)
The best responses of PU1 and PU2 are:
p∗1 =
cp∗2 + a1
2b1
, p∗2 =
cp∗1 + a2
2b2
. (17)
Thus, the duopoly prices at the unique NE are:
p∗1 =
2a1b2 + a2c
4b1b2 − c2
, p∗2 =
2a2b1 + a1c
4b1b2 − c2
. (18)
The spectrum demands at the unique NE can be expressed by:
q∗1 =
2a1b1b2 + b1a2c
4b1b2 − c2
, q∗2 =
2a2b1b2 + b2a1c
4b1b2 − c2
. (19)
The optimal response of the unconstrained game corresponds to the Case 1 that qa1 and q
a
2 satisfy
qa1 > q
∗
1 and q
a
2 > q
∗
2. Three other cases are also considered when the available spectra are not
sufficient for the market demands.
Case 2: q∗1 > q
a
1 and q
a
2 is sufficiently large. According to Eqn.(14), the best revenue of PU1 is
obtained at the point p1 =
a1+cp2
2b1
when the capacity is large enough
qa1 >
a1 + cp2
2
. (20)
Since we assume that qa1 is less than the best spectrum demand, the revenue of PU1 is expressed
as pi1 = piq
a
1 if the following inequality holds:
p1 ≤
a1 − q
a
1 + cp2
b1
. (21)
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Here, we can easily find that this price bound is greater than the best response when PU1 has
a sufficiently large capacity. We next analyze the selfish pricing behavior of PU1. Because PU1
can lease at most qa1 units of spectrum, it is inclined to increase p1 for better monetary payoff
until the spectrum demand is exactly equal to the capacity. For PU2, the optimal response is still
characterized by Eqn.(17) so that it can benefit from the increase of p1. Hence, the prices at the
Nash Equilibrium can be solved by
p†1 =
a1 − q
a
1 + cp
†
2
b1
, and p†2 =
a2 + cp
†
1
2b2
. (22)
The results are give by
p†1 =
2a1b2 + a2c− 2b2q
a
1
2b1b2 − c2
, (23)
p†2 =
a2b1 + a1c− cq
a
1
2b1b2 − c2
. (24)
The spectrum demand of PU2 is:
q†2 =
b2(a2b1 + a1c− cq
a
1)
2b1b2 − c2
, (25)
while that of PU1 is exactly the capacity. Note that in Case 2, the capacity of PU2 must have
q†2 ≤ q
a
2 .
Case 3: q∗2 > q
a
2 and q
a
1 is sufficiently large. The leased spectrum of PU2 reaches q
a
2 so that there
exists
p‡2 =
a2 − q
a
2 + cp
‡
1
b2
. (26)
Following the same method in Case 2, the NE prices of primary users are given by
p‡1 =
a1b2 + a2c− cq
a
2
2b1b2 − c2
, (27)
p‡2 =
2a2b1 + a1c− 2b1q
a
2
2b1b2 − c2
. (28)
The NE demand of PU1 is expressed as:
q‡1 =
b1(a1b2 + a2c− cq
a
2)
2b1b2 − c2
. (29)
Here, the capacity qa1 should be greater than q
‡
1.
Case 4: There are two possible capacity sets in this case, q∗1 ≥ q
a
1 , q
†
2 ≥ q
a
2 or q
‡
1 ≥ q
a
1 , q
∗
2 ≥ q
a
2 .
When both PUs cannot provide the best spectrum demands, they are disposed to increase the
prices until the spectrum demands equal to the capacities. Because qa1 and q
a
2 are purchased by the
secondary users, the prices of per-unit spectrum can be obtained based on the following equations:
qa1 = a1 − b1p
§
1 + cp
§
2,
qa2 = a2 − b2p
§
2 + cp
§
1. (30)
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One can easily obtain the root of above equations:
p§1 =
a1b2 + a2c− b2q
a
1 − cq
a
2
b1b2 − c2
,
p§2 =
a2b1 + a1c− b1q
a
2 − cq
a
1
b1b2 − c2
. (31)
3.2. Static Oligopoly Game
We study the existence of Nash Equilibrium in a more complicated spectrum market. Consider
a set of primary users N = {1, 2, · · ·N} where each of them has a capacity limit. Two key
challenges hinder us from finding the existence of NE. First, we do not know which primary users
have insufficient capacities. Since the secondary users have preference towards the primary users,
a smaller capacity does not necessarily mean the spectrum limitation compared with a larger one.
Second, the interaction of prices is still not well studied in the Bertrand oligopoly market with
capacity constraints.
To carry out our study, we recap some findings in the duopoly spectrum market. A primary user
is capacity-insufficient if the capacity is less than the best demand with unlimited spectrum.
The capacity-insufficient primary user intends to increase the price until the capacity equals to the
market demand. However, we might not be able to find the capacity-insufficient PUs once for all.
When capacity-insufficient PUs increases their prices of per-unit spectrum, secondary users may
go to other PUs, potentially leading to the lack of capacity in those PUs. Therefore, we need to
search several time recursively to find the capacity-insufficient PUs. Inspired by the above findings,
we can obtain the NE via the following steps. First, we compute the best reactions of all PUs
without considering the capacity constraints. In this step, the ith PU decides the price by
pi =
ai +
∑
j 6=i cijpj
2bi
. (32)
Denote Mk to be the number of capacity-insufficient PUs in the k
th search. We can find M1
primary users whose best spectrum demands exceed the capacities in the first search. Let us take
the capacities of M1 PUs into consideration. The capacity-insufficient PUs have the incentive to
increase their prices so as to lower down the spectrum demands:
pi =
ai − q
a
i +
∑
j 6=i cijpj
bi
. (33)
The remaining PUs increase the prices correspondingly. The best reactions of primary users are
solved through the equations in Eqn.(32) and Eqn.(33). Define a new matrix with the parameter
M1 as
Q(M1) =


b1 −c12 . . . . . . . . . . . . −c1N
−c21 b2 . . . . . . . . . . . . −c2N
...
... . . . . . . . . . . . .
...
−cM11 −cM12 . . . bM1 . . . . . . −cM1N
−cM1+1,1 −cM1+1,2 . . . . . . 2bM1+1 . . . −cM1+1,N
...
... . . . . . . . . . . . .
...
−cN1 −cN2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2bN


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and a vector
a(M1) = [a1 − q
a
1 a2 − q
a
2 · · · aM1 − q
a
M1
aM1+1 · · · aN ]
T .
Before identifying the capacity-insufficient PUs in the next step, we need to know whether Q(M1)
is invertible or not.
Lemma 3. The matrixQ(Mk) is positive definite if βi > µ > 0 for all i ∈ N in the utility function.
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
Provided that M1 primary users are capacity-insufficient, the best responses can be solved via
p =
[
Q(M1)
]−1
· a(M1). (34)
For these M1 PUs, their capacities and the best demands have the following inequalities
ai +
∑
j 6=i
cijpj > 2q
a
i . (35)
The spectrum demands of primary user can be obtained using Eqn.(5). In the new solution vector,
we might observe that some additional primary users cannot lease the best spectrum demands. As
a result, they attempt to raise the prices for better revenues. Assume that M2 players have limited
capacities now, we replace the original Q(M1) and a(M1) by
Q(M2) =


b1 −c12 . . . . . . . . . . . . −c1N
−c21 b2 . . . . . . . . . . . . −c2N
...
... . . . . . . . . . . . .
...
−cM21 −cM22 . . . bM2 . . . . . . −cM2N
−cM2+1,1 −cM2+1,2 . . . . . . 2bM2+1 . . . −cM2+1,N
...
... . . . . . . . . . . . .
...
−cN1 −cN2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2bN


and
a(M2) = [a1 − q
a
1 a2 − q
a
2 · · · aM2 − q
a
M2
aM2+1 · · · aN ]
T .
Here, an important question is whether the iterative search method can find more and more
capacity-insufficient primary users? We must show that the search method will not leads to a
deadlock. Before proving the nondecreasing property of search results, we introduce a crucial
definition first.
Definition 1. Stieltjes matrix [18]: A Stieltjes matrix is a real symmetric positive definite
matrix with nonpositive off-diagonal entries. Every Stieltjes matrix is invertible to a nonsingular
symmetric matrix with nonnegative entries.
According to Lemma 1 and 3, one can easily find that Q(Mk) is a Stieltjes matrix. In the following
Lemma, we will show the nondecreasing property of Mk.
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Lemma 4. The set of capacity-insufficient primary users in the k − 1th step is a subset of that in
the kth step.
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
Using this method, we can find the primary users with capacity shortage iteratively. The
proposed method has low computational complexity that requires at most N searching steps.
Next, we will show that the oligopoly price vector computed above is a Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 1. The sets {Mk} at subsequent steps of the search algorithm form a nondecreasing
sequence. The limit of which is the set {M} such that the price vector computed by
p∗ = [Q(M)]−1 · a(M). (36)
is a Nash Equilibrium of type-I oligopoly spectrum market.
Proof: Assume that the primary users in the set M = {1, 2, · · ·M} have insufficient capacities in
respect to the best reactions. Their prices of per-unit spectrum are are determined by Eqn.(33).
The remaining primary users in the set N \M adjust prices according to Eqn.(32). First, we show
that any player i ∈ N \M has no incentive to adjust its price pi. Define a new price p
′
i = p
∗
i ±∆
where ∆ is a positive deviation from p∗i for i ∈ N \M. The difference of the revenues between p
∗
i
and p
′
i is expressed as:
pii(p
′
i,p
∗
−i)− pii(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i)
= p
′
i(ai − bip
′
i +
∑
j 6=i
cijp
∗
j)− p
∗
i (ai − bip
∗
i +
∑
j 6=i
cijp
∗
j )
= (p∗i ±∆)(ai − bi(p
∗
i ±∆) +
∑
j 6=i
cijp
∗
j)− p
∗
i (ai − bip
∗
i +
∑
j 6=i
cijp
∗
j)
= −bi∆
2 + (±∆)(ai − 2bip
∗
i +
∑
j 6=i
cijp
∗
j) = −bi∆
2 < 0.
Thus, the ith primary user obtains smaller revenue if it deviates from the NE price.
Next, we analyze the pricing strategies of the capacity-insufficient PUs. In the iterative scheme,
one principle is that the best demand without capacity constraint is greater than qai for any i ∈ M
(i.e., in Eqn.(35)). Consider the price p
′
i = p
∗
i −∆, the revenue of the i
th PU is:
pii(p
′
i,p
∗
−i) = q
a
i × (p
∗
i −∆) < pii(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i)
because the spectrum demand q
′
i exceeds the capacity q
a
i . If the i
th PU chooses a price p
′
i = p
∗
i +∆,
the resulting revenue is:
pii(p
′
i,p
∗
−i) = (p
∗
i +∆)(ai − bip
∗
i − bi∆+
∑
j 6=i
cijpj)
= pii(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) + ∆(ai − 2bip
∗
i +
∑
j 6=i
cijpj)− bi∆
2
= pii(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) + ∆(2q
a
i − (ai +
∑
j 6=i
cijpj))− bi∆
2
≤ pii(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i)− bi∆
2 < pii(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i).
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Since no player has the incentive to adjust its price, the price vector computed by Eqn.(36) is a
Nash Equilibrium of the oligopoly spectrum game.
Another key question is that whether the NE found by our method is unique or not. We have
the following theorem for this question:
Theorem 2. Consider a type-I oligopoly spectrum market in Eqn.(5), there exists a unique Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
3.3. Leader-Follower Duopoly Game
Up to this point we have considered basically static spectrum games in cognitive radio networks.
However, the primary users may play different roles in the price competition. We now extend the
noncooperative game to the leader-follower framework in which one primary user moves first and
then the other moves sequentially. Consider a duopoly market, we show that the pricing strategies
of primary users rely on their leader/follower roles and capacities. Similar to the static duopoly
games, we also consider four cases in the leader-follower games. (The notations p∗i , p
†
i , p
‡
i and p
§
i
are reused in this subsection with superscripts l and f to stand for the roles of PUs.)
Case 1: We consider the scenario that the PUs have enough spectra for the secondary users. Let
PU1 decide the price first and the PU2 decide afterwards. They aim to maximize their individual
revenue. We use backward induction to find the subgame perfect NE according to the best response
of PU2, qf∗2 (q1), for every possible value of q1. Then, given that PU1 knows PU2’s best response,
we obtain the best response of PU1. Substitute q2 by q
f∗
2 (q1) in the revenue function of PU1, there
has
pi1(p1, p
f∗
2 (p1)) = p1 · (a1 − b1p1 +
c2p1 + ca2
2b2
). (37)
PU1 maximizes its revenue at the point:
pl∗1 =
2a1b2 + ca2
2(2b1b2 − c2)
. (38)
Then, the optimal price of PU2 is expressed as:
pf∗2 =
4a2b1b2 − a2c
2 + 2a1b2c
4b2(2b1b2 − c2)
. (39)
The spectrum demands of the primary users at the leader-follower NE are:
ql∗1 =
2a1b2 + a2c
4b2
, (40)
qf∗2 =
4a2b1b
2
2 − a2b2c
2 + 2a1b
2
2c
4b2(2b1b2 − c2)
. (41)
Note that the capacities qa1 and q
a
2 should be greater than q
l∗
1 and q
f∗
2 respectively.
Similarly, using the backward induction method, we can also obtain the price setting when PU2
is the leading service provider. Comparing the leader-follower game with the static game, both the
leader and the follower achieve higher prices as well as revenues.
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Case 2: qa2 is sufficiently large. q
l∗
1 > q
a
1 if PU1 is the leader and q
f∗
1 > q
a
1 if PU1 is the follower.
The leader-follower NE depends on not only which primary user decides the price first, but
also whether the leader is capacity-insufficient or not. As is mentioned in the static game, the
best response of PU1 is to set the price as p1 = max{
a1+cp2
2b1
,
a1−qa1+cp2
b1
}. To better understand the
leader-follower interaction, we make use of Fig.2 to illustrate the strategies of primary users. Point
A represents the NE in the static game of Case 2. Because the best response of PU1 is greater
than its capacity, it is inclined to increase p1 for better monetary payoff until p
A
1 is reached. In
point A, the spectrum demand of PU1 is exactly qa1 and the price is decided by p1 =
a1−qa1+cp2
b1
.
Ap1
Bp1
Ap2
Bp2
1p
2p
A
B
1
21
1 2b
cpa
q
+
=
1
211
1 b
cpqa
q
a +−
=
)2,0( 22 ba
O
Figure 2: Interactions between p1 and p2
Let PU1 decide the price first and PU2 follow. As a leader, PU1 knows that the follower’s best
response is pf†2 =
a2+cp1
2b2
. Then, in the first stage, the revenue of PU1 is computed by:
pi1 = min{q
a
1 , a1 − b1p1 + cp2} · p1 (42)
= min{qa1 , a1 − b1p1 +
c(a2 + cp1)
2b2
} · p1. (43)
One can easily find that the best revenue is obtained at the point A if the leader has insufficient
capacity. This is to say, the NE in the static game is also the NE in the leader-follower pricing
when the capacity-insufficient PU acts as the leader. Here, the capacity constraints must satisfy
qa1 < q
l∗
1 and q
a
2 > q
f∗
2 where (q
l∗
1 , q
f∗
2 ) is the NE in the unconstrained leader-follower market.
Next, we will show that the leader-follower spectrum game exhibits a quite different strategy
when PU2 is the leader. The PU2 has the complete information of the PU1’s best response in the
second stage. Because PU1 falls short of spectrum, it will set a higher price such that the spectrum
demand equals to the capacity: pf†1 =
a1−qa1+cp2
b1
. Then, the revenue of PU2 is:
pi2 = p2 · (a2 − b2p2 +
c(a1 − q
a
1 + cp2)
b1
). (44)
The best price of PU2 is thus given by:
pl†2 =
a1c+ a2b1 − cq
a
1
2(b1b2 − c2)
. (45)
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Substitute p2 by p
l†
2 in the best response of p
f†
1 (p2), we have the following expression of p
f†
1 :
pf†1 =
2a1b1b2 − a1c
2 − 2qa1b1b2 + c
2qa1 + a2b1c
2b1(b1b2 − c2)
. (46)
This leader-follower NE is illustrated at point B in Fig.2. Comparing the NE equilibria A and B,
we can see that the NE prices depend on the decision sequence of the primary users. When the
primary user with sufficient spectrum is the leader, both of them have higher equilibrium prices.
The purchased spectrum from the PU2 is given by
ql†2 =
a2b
2
1b2 − a2b1c
2 + a1b1b2c− a1c
3 − qa1b1b2c+ c
3qa1
2b1(b1b2 − c2)
. (47)
Likewise, the capacity of PU2 must have qa2 ≥ q
l†
2 .
Case 3: qa1 is sufficiently large. q
l∗
2 > q
a
2 if PU2 is the leader and q
f∗
2 > q
a
2 if PU2 is the follower.
Following the method in Case 2, we can obtain the Nash Equilibria in the leader-follower games.
We omit the solution process and summarize the results as below.
• PU1 is the leader:
pl‡1 =
a2c+ a1b2 − cq
a
2
2(b1b2 − c2)
; (48)
pf‡2 =
2a2b1b2 − a2c
2 − 2qa2b1b2 + c
2qa2 + a1b2c
2b2(b1b2 − c2)
. (49)
• PU2 is the leader:
pf‡1 =
a1b2 + a2c− cq
a
2
2b1b2 − c2
; (50)
pl‡2 =
2a2b1 + a1c− 2b1qa2
2b1b2 − c2
. (51)
Case 4: The remaining capacity conditions exclude the those in the other three cases. We adopt
the backward induction to find the leader-follower NE s. Let PU1 be the leader and PU2 be the
follower. Give the price p1, the best response of player 2 is p
f§
2 =
a2−qa2+cp1
b2
if the capacity qa2 is less
than a2+cp12 . Provided that PU1 knows PU2’s best response, we can obtain the best price of PU1,
pl§1 (p
f§
2 ), so as to obtain the NE for this game. If PU1 is also capacity-limited, the price p
l§
1 (p
f§
2 ) is
set to
a1b2+a2c−b2qa1−cq
a
2
b1b2−c2
and the best price of PU2 is solved subsequently. The leader-follower game
has the same NE as the static game. Furthermore, no matter which primary user is the leader,
the NE s are the same when both of them are capacity-insufficient.
3.4. Dynamic Duopoly Game with Best Response Dynamics
The best responses of the spectrum game are obtained under the assumption that the primary
users have a global knowledge of the demand functions and the capacity constraints. However, the
primary users might only be able to observe the limited market information in practice. A primary
user may update its price in the next round in response to the current prices of the opponents. In
this subsection, we investigate how primary users interact with each other based on their individual
best response functions.
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In the duopoly Bertrand spectrum game, we assume that each primary user merely knows its
demand function, capacity and the price of the opponent. Note that a player has no knowledge of
the capacity of its opponent. The spectrum price of the ith primary user at time t is denoted as
pi(t), and that of the next slot is pi(t+1). Here, the “slot” defines the length of time that primary
users adjust their prices. It can be one hour or one day, which is very flexible. Hence, in each
slot, player i updates the price of per-unit spectrum according to the best response function in the
static game:
pi(t+ 1) =
{
cpj(t)+ai
2bi
if
cpj(t)+ai
2 ≤ q
a
i for i = 1, 2,
ai−qai +cpj(t)
bi
if
cpj(t)+ai
2 ≥ q
a
i for i = 1, 2.
(52)
We then study the stability by assuming the updating rules are predetermined for the primary
users.
Case 1: q∗1 < q
a
1 and q
∗
2 < q
a
2 . The update rule can be written in the matrix form:
p(t+ 1) =
[
0 c2b1
c
2b2
0
]
· p(t) +
[ a1
2b1
a2
2b2
]
. (53)
Denote λ1 and λ2 to be the eigenvalues of the transfer matrix in Eqn.(53). One can easily find
that λ1 and λ2 are within the unit circle provided the feasibility constraint of the spectrum game:
b1b2 > c
2. According to the Routh-Hurvitz condition, the price adaptation scheme is stable.
Case 2: q∗1 > q
a
1 and q
∗
2 < q
a
2 . The updating rule in the matrix form is expressed as:
p(t+ 1) =
[
0 c
b1
c
2b2
0
]
· p(t) +
[
a1−qa1
b1
a2
2b2
]
. (54)
Under the condition b1b2 > c
2, the eigenvalues of the transfer matrix are also in the unit circle.
Thus, the updating rule is stable. The price updating schemes are stable in Case 3 and Case 4.
We omit the analysis since they are similar to Case 1 and Case 2.
However, without the information of q∗i , player i might not know how to select the price
adaptation rule. We introduce a simple algorithm named “StrictBEST” to update the prices
without knowing the demand function of the opponent. In each iteration, the ith primary user
determines the price by
pi(t+ 1) = max{
cpj(t) + ai
2bi
,
ai − q
a
i + cpj(t)
bi
}. (55)
The above scheme has been used for the price adjustment of the two-stage game in [3]. We present
the detailed proofs under different capacity constraints. However, the above proof is incomplete
because the primary users might switch the price adjustment rules from time to time. This imposes
great difficulty to prove the convergence of the rule in Eqn.(55). Here, we present a conjecture on
the StrictBEST algorithm.
Conjecture 1. The StrictBEST algorithm converges to the unique Nash Equilibrium if the market
parameters are positive as well as b1 > c and b2 > c.
We propose a “potential” method to prove the above conjecture. This method needs to consider
many cases, which can not be exhausted in this paper. An key observation is that the price of
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a primary user is a function of its price two slot before. Thus, the StrictBEST algorithm might
be able to converge if the prices of primary users get closer and closer to the NE every 2 slots.
As we know, there are four types of capacity constraints (i.e. Case 1∼4 in this subsection). At
time t, PU1 and PU2 have four different strategy profiles, and at time t + 1, they also have four
types of adjustment strategies, resulting a total number of 64 scenarios within two slots. Due to
the complexity of this “potential” method, we do not prove the convergence property case by case.
Here, we abuse to denote the equilibrium price of ith PU to be p∗i . The guidelines of the “potential”
proof are summarized as below,
• Prove that there exists only one equilibrium in Eqn.(55) when the spectrum capacities qa1
and qa2 are given.
• The distance between the price of user i and its equilibrium price is becoming smaller and
smaller every two slots, that is, |pi(t+ 2)− p
∗
i | < |pi(t)− p
∗
i |.
3.5. Dynamic Duopoly Game with Bounded Rationality
In a practical spectrum market, a primary user may not be able to observe the profit gained
by other primary services. Except the adjustment rule based on best response function, a primary
user can also choose price for secondary users by learning the behaviors of other players from
the history. Bounded rationality mimics the human behavior that players do not make perfectly
rational decisions due to the limited information and their conservativeness. The notion of bounded
rationality, also denoted as gradient dynamics, is employed in dynamic Cournot oligopoly models
[11, 12, 13]. Authors in [2] adopts bounded rational strategy to adjust spectrum price for the first
time. The bounded rational rule is equivalent to a distributed algorithm that gradually approaches
the equilibrium price. For instance, if a primary user is assumed to be a bounded rational player,
though ignorant of the actual demand, it updates the price of per-unit spectrum based on a local
estimate of the marginal profit [2]. In this subsection, we adopt the similar strategy to perform
dynamic pricing in duopoly spectrum market. The major difference lies in that we concentrate on
the interactions of duopoly primary users with capacity constraints. When the capacity is large
enough, the ith PU adjusts its price according to the following rule:
pi(t+ 1) = pi(t) + γipi(t) ·
∂pii(t)
∂pi(t)
, i = 1, 2, (56)
where γi is the learning stepsize. The learning rate pi(t) ·
∂pii(t)
∂pi(t)
captures the conservativeness of
players that may not totally believe the observed market information. If player i cannot provide
the optimal spectrum demand, it updates the price pi =
ai−qai +cpj
bi
in each period.
In a self-mapping system, the most important issue is the stability property. We first analyze
local stability of the dynamic spectrum sharing in Case 1. At the equilibrium point of price
adaptation, there has p(t+1) = p(t) = p∗. Since pi(t) is a self-mapping function, the fixed points
can be obtained by solving the following equations:
γ1p1(a1 − 2b1p1 + cp2) = 0, (57)
γ2p2(a2 − 2b2p2 + cp1) = 0. (58)
In this duopoly spectrum game with bounded rationality, the self-mapping dynamic system has
four fixed points p(1), p(2), p(3) and p(4) as follows:
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p(2) =
[ a1
2b1
, 0
]
, p(3) =
[
0,
a2
2b2
]
,
p(4) =
[2a1b2 + a2c
4b1b2 − c2
,
2a2b1 + a1c
4b1b2 − c2
]
,
and p(1) = [0, 0]. Clearly, one can see the fixed point p(4) without zero price is the Nash Equilib-
rium.
Here, we apply the “Routh-Hurvitz” condition to analyze the stability of these fixed points. At
the equilibrium p(1), the Jacobian matrix of the self-mapping system is expressed as:
J(p(1)) =
[
J11(p
(1)) J12(p
(1))
J21(p
(1)) J22(p
(1))
]
=
[
1 + γ1a1 0
0 1 + γ2a2
]
. (59)
The self-mapping system is stable only when the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are in the unit
circle. Because γi and ai are nonnegative, the eigenvalues are greater than 1. Hence, the fixed
point p(1) is unstable in the self-mapping model. For the fixed point p(2), the Jacobian matrix is
J(p(2)) =
[
J11(p
(2)) J12(p
(2))
J21(p
(2)) J22(p
(2))
]
=
[
1− γ1a1
γ1a1c
2b1
0 1 + γ2(a2 +
a1c
2b1
)
]
(60)
which means that p(2) is not a stable equilibrium. Similarly, the fixed point p(3) is not stable
either. For the fixed point p(4), the Jacobian matrix is
J(p(4))=
[
J11(p
(4)) J12(p
(4))
J21(p
(4)) J22(p
(4))
]
=
[
1− 2γ1b1(2a1b2+a2c)
4b1b2−c2
γ1c(2a1b2+a2c)
4b1b2−c2
γ2c(2a2b1+a1c)
4b1b2−c2
1− 2γ2b2(2a2b1+a1c)
4b1b2−c2
]
. (61)
The characteristic function of the Jacobian matrix is given by:
λ2 − λ(J11(p
(4)) + J22(p
(4)))− J12(p
(4)) · J21(p
(4)) = 0. (62)
The eigenvalues λ1 and λ2 are
λ1,2 =
(J11 + J22)±
√
(J11 + J22)2 − 4J12J21
2
. (63)
The fixed point p(4) is stable only when |λ1| and |λ2| are within the unit circle. Given the spectrum
market parameters and the learning rates γ1,2, one can easily check the stability of the Nash
Equilibrium.
Next, we analyze the dynamics of price adaptation with bounded rationality in Case 2. Since
PU1 cannot supply the best spectrum demand of the secondary users, its price update follows the
rule p1 =
a1−qa1+cp2
b1
. By letting p(t+1) = p(t), we solve the fixed points of the self-mapping system:
p(1) = [
a1−qa1
b1
, 0] and p(2) = [
2b2a1+a2c−2b2qa1
2b1b2−c2
,
a1c+a2b1−qa1 c
2b1b2−c2
]. Likewise, we apply the “Routh-Hurvitz”
condition to the resulting Jacobian matrices. For the fixed point p(1), the Jacobian matrix is given
by
J(p(1)) =
[
0 c
b1
0 1 + γ2(a2 +
c(a1−qa1 )
b1
)
]
. (64)
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Note that a1 is greater than the available spectrum q
a
1 . Thus, the fixed point p
(1) is unstable. In
the equilibrium point p(2) of Case 2, the Jacobian matrix is written as
J(p(2)) =
[
0 c
b1
γ2c(a1c+a2b1−qa1c)
2b1b2−c2
1−
2γ2b2(a1c+a2b1−qa1 c)
2b1b2−c2
]
. (65)
Following Eqn.(63), we can obtain the eigenvalues λ1 and λ2, and validate the stability of the
self-mapping system. The stability analyses of Case 3 and Case 4 are omitted because the Case
3 is very similar to the Case 2 and the Case 4 adopts exactly the best response strategy.
In the dynamic spectrum game, a primary user has no information of demand functions and
capacities of its opponent. Thus, it is necessary to compare the prices upon the situations whether
the capacity is sufficient or not. We present a distribute scheme, namely “StrictBR”, for the price
update with strict capacity constraints:
pi(t+ 1) = max{
ai − q
a
i + cpj(t)
bi
, pi(t) + γipi(t)(ai − 2bipi(t) + cpj(t))}, (66)
for i, j = 1 or 2. When the price happens to be 0 in the iteration, the primary users need choose
a small positive price randomly to leave the zero equilibrium point.
4. Noncooperative Game with Type-II Capacity Constraints
In this section, we analyze static and dynamic spectrum games with Type-II capacity con-
straints. An iterative strategy is proposed to set prices by using local market information.
4.1. Static Duopoly Game
We analyze the competitive pricing of duopoly primary users who aim to maximize their utili-
ties. The utility (or profit) is composed of two parts, the revenue and the delay-based cost. In the
feasible region, the utility of the ith primary user is expressed as
pii(pi,p−i) = pi(ai − bipi + cpj)− θ log
Bi/r
(p)
i
qai − ai + bipi − cpj
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
To find the best response of the primary users, we differentiate the utility pii with respect to pi and
let the derivative be 0, there have
∂pi1
p1
= a1 − 2b1p1 + cp2 +
θb1
qa1 − a1 + b1p1 − cp2
= 0, (67)
∂pi2
p2
= a2 − 2b2p2 + cp1 +
θb2
qa2 − a2 + b2p2 − cp1
= 0. (68)
To reduce the complexity of expression in Eqn.(67) and (68), we represent the prices pi using the
spectrum demands qi in Eqn.(2) for i = 1, 2. Thus, the above equations are transformed into
follows:
q1 − b1(α1 − β1q1 − µq2) +
θb1
qa1 − q1
= 0, (69)
q2 − b2(α2 − β2q2 − µq1) +
θb2
qa2 − q2
= 0, (70)
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where qi is within the feasible region S = {qi|0 ≤ qi ≤ q
a
i , i = 1, 2}. In the above nonlinear
equations, the explicit forms of q1 and q2 cannot be solved directly. Submit q1 in Eqn.(69) to
Eqn.(70), we have
b1α1 − (1 + β1b1)q1 −
θb1
qa1−q1
µb1
· (1 + β2b2) + µb2q1
= b2α2 −
θb2
qa2 −
b1α1−(1+β1b1)q1−
θb1
qa
1
−q1
µb1
. (71)
We next show that there is only one solution in the range (0, qa1). The left-hand expression can be
further rewritten as:
b1α1 − q1 −
θb1
qa1−q1
µb1
· (1 + β2b2)−
1
µ
(β1 + β1β2b2 − µ
2b2).
One can see that the left-hand expression is a strictly decreasing function of q1 in the feasible
region. The right-hand expression of Eqn.(71) is a strictly increasing function of q1 in the range
(0, qa1). When q1 approaches q
a
1 , the right-hand expression is approximated by b2α2, while the
left-hand expression is negatively infinite. Hence, there exist a unique feasible solution in Eqn.(71)
only if the left-hand is greater than the right-hand at the point q1 = 0. We can find the range of
θ to guarantee the unique feasible solution for q1. Here, we only show that there exists a unique
q1 ∈ (0, q
a
1) in this duopoly market when θ is small. In the point q1 = 0, the difference between the
left-hand and the right-hand is approximated by
a1
µ
+
α1β2b2 − α2b2µ
µ
> 0
since α1β2 > α2µ holds in the duopoly model. The above analysis also implies that there exists a
unique Nash Equilibrium when θ is sufficiently small.
4.2. Static Oligopoly Game
In this subsection, we extend the above analysis to a more general oligopoly spectrum game
with type-II constraints. By introducing a novel variable transformation method, we analytically
show the existence of unique NE. Given the utility of the ith primary user, we take the first-order
derivative over pi:
∂pii
pi
= ai − 2bipi + c
∑
j 6=i
pj +
θbi
qai − ai + bipi − c
∑
j 6=i pj
= 0. (72)
Unlike the duopoly spectrum game, we cannot directly find the equations to solve pi for more
than two primary users. To simplify the analysis, we substitute the variables pi by qi according to
Eqn.(2) for i ∈ N . Formally, there exists
qi − bi(αi − βiqi − µ
∑
j 6=i
pj) +
θbi
qai − qi
= 0, ∀i ∈ N . (73)
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We denote a new variable Z =
∑
i∈N qi to be the total spectrum provision in the oligopoly market.
Thus, the above equations can be transformed into:
(1 + βibi − µbi)qi + µbiZ − αibi +
θibi
qai − qi
= 0, ∀i ∈ N . (74)
Assume that Z is a constant, the original coupled equations are converted into a set of separated
quadratic formations:
(1 + βibi − µbi)q
2
i − ((1 + βibi − µbi)q
a
i + αibi − µbiZ)qi
−(µbiZq
a
i − αibiq
a
i + θbi) = 0, ∀i ∈ N . (75)
For the ith PU, qi has two roots:
q
(1)
i =
((1 + βibi − µbi)q
a
i + αibi − µbiZ)
2(1 + βibi − µbi)
+
√
((1 + βibi − µbi)qai + αibi − µbiZ)
2 + 4(1 + βibi − µbi)(µbiZqai − αibiq
a
i + θbi)
2(1 + βibi − µbi)
=
((1 + βibi − µbi)q
a
i + αibi − µbiZ)
2(1 + βibi − µbi)
+
√
(−(1 + βibi − µbi)qai + αibi − µbiZ)
2 + 4(1 + βibi − µbi)θbi
2(1 + βibi − µbi)
(76)
q
(2)
i =
((1 + βibi − µbi)q
a
i + αibi − µbiZ)
2(1 + βibi − µbi)
−
√
(−(1 + βibi − µbi)qai + αibi − µbiZ)
2 + 4(1 + βibi − µbi)θbi
2(1 + βibi − µbi)
. (77)
We need to validate if the roots are within the feasible ranges. Let q
(1)
i and q
(2)
i minus q
a
i , we have
q
(1)
i − q
a
i =
(−(1 + βibi − µbi)q
a
i + αibi − µbiZ)
2(1 + βibi − µbi)
+
√
(−(1 + βibi − µbi)qai + αibi − µbiZ)
2 + 4(1 + βibi − µbi)θbi
2(1 + βibi − µbi)
> 0, (78)
and
q
(2)
i − q
a
i =
(−(1 + βibi − µbi)q
a
i + αibi − µbiZ)
2(1 + βibi − µbi)
−
√
(−(1 + βibi − µbi)qai + αibi − µbiZ)
2 + 4(1 + βibi − µbi)θbi
2(1 + βibi − µbi)
< 0, (79)
because βi is greater than µ. When qi is chosen to be q
(2)
i for each primary user i, it is represented
by a function of Z. Define a set of functions hi(Z) = q
(2)
i for i ∈ N , we will show that hi(Z) is a
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decreasing function. Differentiate hi(Z) over Z, we have
∂hi(Z)
∂Z
=
−µbi
√
(−(1 + βibi − µbi)qai + αibi − µbiZ)
2 + 4(1 + βibi − µbi)θbi
2(1 + βibi − µbi)(
√
(−(1 + βibi − µbi)qai + αibi − µbiZ)
2 + 4(1 + βibi − µbi)θbi)
µbi(−(1 + βibi − µbi)q
a
i + αibi − µbiZ)
2(1 + βibi − µbi)(
√
(−(1 + βibi − µbi)qai + αibi − µbiZ)
2 + 4(1 + βibi − µbi)θbi)
< 0. (80)
Sum up all the spectrum demands, we obtain the following self-mapping equation:
Z =
N∑
i=1
hi(Z). (81)
The left-hand of the above one-dimensional function is strictly increasing, while the right-hand is
a bounded and decreasing function. To guarantee the existence of unique solution, the right-hand
should be greater than the left-hand when Z is 0:
N∑
i=1
((1 + βibi − µbi)q
a
i + αibi)
2(1 + βibi − µbi)
−
N∑
i=1
√
(−(1 + βibi − µbi)qai + αibi)
2 + 4(1 + βibi − µbi)θbi
2(1 + βibi − µbi)
> 0. (82)
The above inequality has a much simpler necessary condition. By separating the inequality (82)
into N smaller inequalities for primary users, we obtain the necessary conditions αiq
a
i ≥ θ for
i ∈ N . The solution Z∗ can be solved numerically via binary search or golden search methods.
Subsequently, the individual spectrum demands can be obtained through Eqn.(77). Since the
demand qi is nonnegative, Z
∗ and the market parameters must have µbiZq
a
i − αibiq
a
i + θbi ≤ 0.
Formally, we have the following theorem on the existence of unique NE :
Theorem 3. Consider a type-II oligopoly spectrum market in Eqn.(12) with N primary users.
There exists a unique Nash Equilibrium if the following conditions hold:
• βi > µ for all i ∈ N ;
• αi, βi, µ, ai, bi > 0 for all i ∈ N , and ci,j > 0 for i, j ∈ N , i 6= j;
• αiq
a
i ≥ θ for i ∈ N ;
• Given the unique solution Z∗ to Eqn.(81), there has µbiZq
a
i − αibiq
a
i + θbi ≤ 0 for i ∈ N .
4.3. Dynamic Duopoly Game with Best Response Dynamics
In the dynamic spectrum game, the revenue and the QoS of a primary user are not available
to its opponent. Hence, the decision of prices is made based on the local utility function and the
observed prices. We adopt the best response scheme to adjust the prices of per-unit spectrum.
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Each player assumes that it is the only service provider in the spectrum market. According to
Eqn.(67) and (68), the price pi is a function of pj (∀i 6= j) in each time period
2b21p
2
1 +
(
2b1(q
a
1 − a1 − cp2)− b1(a1 + cp2)
)
p1
−(a1 + cp2)(q
a
1 − a1 − cp2)− b1θ = 0, (83)
2b22p
2
2 +
(
2b2(q
a
2 − a2 − cp1)− b2(a2 + cp1)
)
p2
−(a2 + cp1)(q
a
2 − a2 − cp1)− b2θ = 0. (84)
The prices p1 and p2 can be easily solved by treating the opponent’s price as a constant. Denote
p
(1)
1 (p2) and p
(2)
1 (p2) to be the roots of Eqn.(83). Let p
(1)
2 (p1) and p
(2)
2 (p1) be the roots of Eqn.(84).
A subsequent problem is how to select the “appropriate” prices for both players. According to the
Eqn.(8) and (9), player i computes the spectrum demands qi(p
(1)
i (pj)) and qi(p
(2)
i (pj)) for i 6= j. If
one of the demands is in the range (0, qai ), the corresponding price is selected to lease the spectrum.
The preceding analysis also shows that under certain market condition, there is only one feasible
price for each primary user. Both of the demands might also be outside/inside of the range (0, qai )
for some special reasons such as random noise etc. Under this situation, the price is chosen to
receive better utility. We propose a distributed algorithm named “QoSBEST” to determine the
prices, which can also be extended to a more general oligopoly market. The “QoSBEST” algorithm
is specified in Fig.3.
1: Calculate the prices of per-unit spectrum in Eqn.(83) and (84);
2: q
(k)
i (t+ 1) = ai − bip
(k)
i (t+ 1) + cpj(t), for i 6= j and k = 1, 2;
//predict the current demands
3: If q
(1)
i < q
a
i and q
(2)
i ≥ q
a
i
4: pi(t) = p
(1)
i ;
5: elseif q
(1)
i ≥ q
a
i and q
(2)
i < q
a
i
6: pi(t) = p
(2)
i ;
7: end
Figure 3: QoSBEST Algorithm
An important question is that whether the QoSBEST algorithm converges to the Nash Equi-
librium. We first give a lemma that will be used in the proof and then present the complete proof
of convergence.
Lemma 5. For any real positive constants x, y and z, there have
− (x+ y) ≤
√
x2 + z2 −
√
y2 + z2 ≤ x+ y. (85)
and √
x2 + z2 −
√
y2 + z2 ≤ x− y, if x ≥ y. (86)
Proof: Omitted due to its simplicity.
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Theorem 4. The QoSBEST algorithm converges to the unique NE if the market parameters are
positive as well as b1 > c > 0 and b2 > c > 0.
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
With the type-II constraints, there are multiple fixed points in the bounded rationality model.
The marginal profit based iterative scheme may possibly converge to a fixed point outside of the
feasible region. Hence, we avoid to consider the dynamic game with bounded rationality in this
section.
5. Performance Evaluation
We present the numerical results to evaluate the price competition and the performance of
adjustment strategies in the duopoly spectrum market. Distinguished from some previous work,
several important dynamic behaviors are investigated such as bifurcation diagrams, strange attrac-
tors and Lyapunov exponents.
5.1. Static and Leader-Follower Games with Type-I Constraints
We first study the NE s of static and leader-follower duopoly games under different settings. To
perform the numerical analysis, we configure the parameters for the Bertrand demand functions:
q1 = 30MHz − 2p1 + 1.5p2;
q2 = 30MHz − 4p2 + 1.5p1.
where the unit of pi is dollar/MHz and that of qi is MHz for i = 1, 2. In this cognitive radio
environment, the primary users have capacity constraints when leasing the unused spectra. Ac-
cording to the best responses in the Type-I model, one can easily compute the optimal prices and
spectrum demands without capacity constraints: p∗1 = 9.58, p
∗
2 = 5.55, q
∗
1 = 19.16 and q
∗
2 = 22.18.
In the first experiment, we assume that the capacity of PU2 is large enough, while that of PU1 is
limited. When PU1’s capacity increases from 4MHz to 24MHz, the prices and the revenues at the
static NE s are shown in Fig.4 and 5. With the increase of PU1’s capacity, both of them tend to
reduce the prices to compete for secondary users. Although the price of PU1 descends, its revenue
increases on the contrary due to the increased capacity. In term of PU2, its price and spectrum
demand decrease until the corresponding values in Case I are met. Next, we analyze the prices
and the revenues at the NE s when the capacity of PU2 is constrained by 15MHz and that of PU1
increases from 4MHz to 24MHz. Fig.6 shows that the prices of PU1 and PU2 decrease when qa1
grows. In Fig.7, the revenue of PU2 becomes smaller and smaller because the price p†2 decreases
while the spectrum demand is constrained by its capacity.
We also illustrate the NE s of the leader-follower games. Let us first consider the case that
both primary users have unlimited capacities. When PU1 is the leader and PU2 is the follower,
the prices at the NE are p∗1 = 10.36 and p
∗
2 = 5.69. The corresponding spectrum demands are
q∗1 = 17.81 and q
∗
2 = 22.77. When PU2 is the leader and PU1 is the follower, the prices and
the spectrum demands at the NE are obtained: p∗1 = 9.75, p
∗
2 = 6, q
∗
1 = 19.50 and q
∗
2 = 20.63.
Next, we study the NE s in the case that PU2 has sufficient spectrum and PU1’s capacity increases
from 4MHz to 24MHz. The prices and revenues are compared in Fig.8 and 9 depending on which
primary user is the leader. When the capacity of PU1 is less than 18MHz, the primary users have
better prices and revenues if PU2 plays the role of market leader. One can easily draw a conclusion
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Figure 5: The change of revenues when qa1 increases from 4MHz to 24MHz and q
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2 is sufficiently
large
that the primary user with sufficient capacity, instead of the capacity-insufficient one, is profitable
to be the leader in the duopoly Bertrand game. When we further increase the PU1’s capacity, the
NE s become those in Case 1.
5.2. Static Games with Type-II Constraints
In this subsection, we simulate the competitive pricing of the static spectrum game with type-II
constraints. Specifically, we evaluate the price of per-unit spectrum and utilities by varying the
capacity constraints and the QoS coefficient θ. Note that the utility of primary users with type-II
constraints contains θ log(Bi/k
(p)
i ) for i = 1, 2. Since they are constants, we only compare the parts
in the utility functions that are related to the prices.
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In the first set of experiments, the coefficient θ is set to 0.1, and the capacities of primary
users increase from 4MHz to 24MHz. The prices of PU1 at the NEs are shown in Fig.10. The
numerical experiments manifest that the prices of per-unit spectrum decreases with the increase
of the primary users’ capacities. Fig.11 demonstrates the utilities of PU1, in which the utility is
an increasing function with respect to the capacity of PU2. One can see that the utilities grow
when PU1 and PU2 increase their capacities. In the second set of experiments, we aim to explore
the relationship between θ and the price competition. Let qa1 and q
a
2 be 15MHz. When θ increases
from 0.001 to 20, the prices of the primary users are shown in Fig.12. When θ becomes larger, the
primary users are inclined to increase the prices to reduce the utility loss caused by the penalty
functions.
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Figure 9: Revenues verses PU1’s Capacity in the Leader-Follower Game for Sufficiently Large qa2
5.3. Dynamic Game
We examine the dynamic behaviors of the noncooperative games with Type-I and Type-II
constraints. Especially, the convergence rates of the proposed algorithms: StrictBEST, StrictBR
andQoSBEST are evaluated. In the type-I model, we evaluate two settings that correspond to Case
1 and Case 2 respectively: {qa1 = 100MHz, q
a
2 = 100MHz} and {q
a
1 = 10MHz, q
a
2 = 100MHz}.
The QoS coefficient θ is set to 0.1 in the QoSBEST scheme. The price adaptations of StrictBEST
and QoSBEST are shown in Fig.13-14. One can see that both StrictBEST and QoSBEST quickly
converge to their individual equilibrium points. The dynamic adjustment of the StrictBR scheme
is shown in Fig.15-16 where the learning rates γ1,2 are both set to 0.01 and 0.03. The convergence
rate of StrictBR depends on the learning rates γ1 and γ2. By cross-comparing Fig.15 and Fig.16,
we observe that the convergence rate of Case 2 is faster than that of Case 1. This is because the
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adjustment strategy of PU1 does not have a conservative learning procedure in Case 2. In the
StrictBR scheme, small learning rates can guarantee stability of the self-mapping system, however,
at the cost of slow convergence speeds.
5.4. Nonlinear Instability with Bounded Rationality
We explore the nonlinear dynamics such as bifurcation and chaos in the type-I duopoly game
with bounded rationality. These complex behaviors are important because they reveal how prices
of primary users evolve over time and how initial conditions influence the results of spectrum
allocation. As is shown above, the StrictBR scheme can be applied in Case 1,2,3. Thus, we only
consider Case 1 and Case 2 in the numerical studies since Case 3 is similar to Case 2.
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Figure 12: The price of PUs in type-II model when the parameter θ varies
Fig.17 shows the bifurcation diagram of Case 1 with respect to the learning rate γ1. Here, the
capacities of PU1 and PU2 are both 100MHz. The learning rate γ2 is fixed to be 0.01 and the
learning rate γ1 increases from 0.01 to 0.09. The bifurcation diagram manifests that the attractor
of Case 1 model is multivalued in term of parameter γ1. One can also see in Fig.17 that there exists
a stable NE when γ1 is less than 0.0511. As γ1 further increases, the NE become unstable and
infinitely periodic doubling that leads to chaos eventually. The bifurcation diagram of Case 2 with
respect to γ2 is illustrated in Fig.18 where the capacity bounds are q
a
1 =10MHz and q
a
2 =100MHz.
The learning rate γ1 is 0.01 and the learning rate γ2 grows from 0.01 to 0.06. When γ2 is less than
0.0331, the StrictBR scheme converges to the unique NE of Case 2 duopoly model.
We show the graphs of strange attractors for Case 1 with the parameter constellation (γ1, γ2) =
(0.07, 0.02) in Fig.19 and for Case 2 with the parameter constellation (γ1, γ2) = (0.01, 0.06) in
Fig.20. Especially, Fig.20 exhibits a fractal structure similar to Henon attractor [14].
The Lyapunov exponent of a dynamical system characterizes the rate of separation of infinites-
imally close trajectories. To analyze the parameter settings in which aperiodic behaviors occur, we
compute the maximal Lyapunov exponents for the learning rates. If the maximal Lyapunov expo-
nent is positive, the duopoly game with bounded rationality is chaotic. For Case 1, the maximal
Lyapunov exponent is shown in Fig.21 as a function of the learning rate γ1. When γ1 is 0.0511,
the maximal Lyapunov exponent becomes positive, which causes the first periodic doubling bi-
furcation in Fig.17. When γ1 is greater than 0.0671, the maximal Lyapunov exponent is greater
than 0. This indicates that the self-mapping price adaptation is a chaotic system. In Fig.22, we
display the maximal Lyapunov exponent of Case 2 with respect to the learning rate γ2. Here, the
learning rate γ1 is set to 0.01. When the learning rate γ2 is around 0.0331, the duopoly game in
Case 2 meets the first doubling bifurcation. With the increase of γ2, the dynamic price adaptation
becomes chaotic.
6. Related Work
The rapid development of wireless communication systems in the past two decades have resulted
in the great needs of a finite and scarce resource: wireless spectrum. On the other hand, existing
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wireless devices operate in the fixed frequency bands, which can be very inefficient in terms of
spectrum utilization. The research carried out by FCC shows that temporal and geographical
variations in the utilization of the assigned spectrum range from 15% to 85% [4]. As a promising
technology, dynamic spectrum access is brought forward in the design of next generation wireless
communication systems. The under-utilized spectrum bands can be detected and exploited by the
users equipped with cognitive radios. For the detailed information, interested readers can refer to
recent surveys in [5] and [6].
One key feature of dynamic spectrum access is how the primary users (or wireless service
provides) and the secondary users (or end users) share the spectrum efficiently and fairly. In
particular, the dynamic spectrum sharing may involve selling and purchasing processes. Thus, it
is natural to study the interactions of network components for dynamic spectrum sharing from
the perspective of economics. The existing work can be mainly grouped into two classes: auction-
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based [7, 8, 9] and price-based [2, 10, 3]. Authors in the seminal work [7] target at the dishonest
bidding issues in an eBay-like dynamic spectrum market. A truthful and computationally efficient
auction mechanism is presented to perform dynamic spectrum allocation. To maximize revenue and
spectrum utilization, authors in [20] propose a real-time spectrum auction framework to distribute
spectrum among a large number wireless users under interference constraints. Zhu and Liu [8]
propose an auction-based collusion-resistant dynamic spectrum allocation approach to combat
user collusion in cognitive wireless networks. An economic framework is also presented in [9]
to model the spectrum allocation to wireless service providers (WSPs) and the interaction of of
end users with the WSPs, but the competition among WSPs is not the focus. Leveraging on
microeconomics inspired mechanisms, authors in [19] develop both bargaining and auction based
mechanisms to find the most optimized allocation pattern for a given area and allocation duration.
Some other auction based spectrum sharing mechanisms can be found in [22, 23, 23, 25, 26]. In
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the price-based class, Niyato and Hossain [2] introduce the oligopoly pricing theory to characterize
the interactions between the primary users and the secondary users. In the oligopoly spectrum
market, a commonly used quadratic utility is adopted to quantify the spectrum demand of the
secondary service, and each primary user aims to maximize the individual profit. In another work
[10], they consider the dynamic spectrum sharing among a primary user and multiple secondary
users. They formulate the problem as an oligopoly market competition and use a noncooperative
game to obtain the Nash Equilibrium. Very recently in an important work [3], Jia and Zhang
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formulate the price and the spectrum competitions as a two-stage non-cooperative game that is
inspired by the theoretic analyses of Cournot and Bertrand games [16, 17]. In [21], authors consider
a primary user employing CDMA at the physical layer who aims to lease its spectrum within
a certain geographic subregion. [28] studies a revenue maximization problem in a Stackelberg
game, where spectrum owner, primary users and secondary users are the players for opportunistic
spectrum access. Besides, authors in [27] build a game theoretic model to investigate whether light
regulation in the form of etiquette protocols, device design and bargaining amongst users can avoid
the tragedy of common in unlicensed spectrum. In terms of nonlinear dynamics in the economics,
authors in [15] have shown that the bounded rationality can cause chaotic behaviors in a Cournot
duopoly.
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7. Conclusion
This paper suggests an economic framework for dynamic spectrum allocation in the emerging
cognitive radio networks. The primary users serve as the spectrum brokers that lease the excessive
frequency to the secondary users for monetary payoff. We present oligopoly Bertrand market
models to characterize the capacity-limited spectrum sharing with two types of constraints: the
strict constraints (type-I) and the QoS penalty functions (type-II). In the type-I oligopoly market,
we present a low-complexity scheme to search the NE and prove its uniqueness. Especially, when
the number of primary users reduces to two, we demonstrate the interesting revenue gaps in
the leader-follower game. Two iterative algorithm, StrictBEST and StrictBR, are presented to
adjust the prices when the primary users only possesses the local market information. In the
type-II model, we prove the existence of unique NE and propose a price updating algorithm
named QoSBEST. Numerical examples validate our analysis and manifest the effectiveness of our
proposals. In particular, we experimentally show the representative nonlinear dynamics in the
StrictBR algorithm such as bifurcations, chaotic maps as well as Lyapunov exponents. Our future
research will be placed on the competitive pricing in more complicated markets, e.g. the number
of active primary users are not deterministic.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1: The matrix T is positive definite if the market parameters has βi > µ > 0 for all
i ∈ N .
Proof: Given a N × 1 nonzero, real vector x, there has,
xTTx = xT


β1 µ . . . µ
µ β2 . . . µ
...
...
. . .
...
µ µ . . . βN

x
= xT
(
µ


1 1 . . . 1
1 1 . . . 1
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 . . . 1

+


β1 − µ 0 . . . 0
0 β2 − µ . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . βN − µ

)x
= µ(
N∑
i=1
xi)
2 +
N∑
i=1
(βi − µ)x
2
i > 0. (87)
Hence, the matrix T is positive definite if βi > µ > 0 for all i ∈ N .
Lemma 2: The parameters that characterize demand-price function in Eqn.(5), i.e. bi and cij
(i 6= j), are positive, given the conditions βi > µ > 0 for all i, j ∈ N .
Proof:We use Cramer’s rule to compute the invertible matrix of T as follows,
T−1 =
1∣∣T∣∣ (Uij)T = 1∣∣T∣∣ (Uji) = 1∣∣T∣∣


U11 U21 · · · Un1
U12 U22 · · · Un2
...
...
. . .
...
U1n U2n · · · Unn

 , (88)
where |T| is the determinant of T and Uij is the matrix cofactor. Then, the variable bi can be
expressed as bi =
Uii
|T | . The variables cij can be written as cij =
Uji
|T | when i 6= j. Since T is positive
definite, |T| is greater than 0. The cofactor Uii is
Uii =
1∣∣T∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
β1 . . . . . . . . . . . . µ
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . µ
... . . . βi−1 . . . . . . µ
... . . . . . . βi+1 . . . µ
... . . . . . . . . .
. . . µ
µ . . . . . . . . . . . . βN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
,
where all the elements except diagonal ones in the above determinant are µ. According to Lemma
1, one can easily find bi > 0 for all i ∈ N . Similarly, we can also prove that Uji is negative for all
i, j ∈ N and i 6= j. Thus, the market parameters cij are all positive for i, j ∈ N and i 6= j. The
only difference lies in that we need to exchange certain columns in the determinant before applying
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Lemma 1.
Lemma 3: The matrix Q(Mk) is positive definite if βi > µ > 0 for all i ∈ N in the utility function.
Proof: We prove this lemma by contradiction.
Q(Mk) =


b1 −c12 . . . . . . −c1N
−c21 b2 . . . . . . −c2N
...
... . . . . . .
...
...
... . . . . . .
...
−cN1 −cN2 . . . . . . bN


+


0 . . . . . . . . . . . .
... . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 . . . bMk+1 . . . 0
... . . . . . . . . .
...
0 . . . . . . . . . bN


=


β1 µ . . . µ
µ β2 . . . µ
...
...
. . .
...
µ µ . . . βN


−1
+


0 . . . . . . . . . . . .
... . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 . . . bMk+1 . . . 0
... . . . . . . . . .
...
0 . . . . . . . . . bN


.
We assume that the matrix Q(Mk) is singular. Thus, there exists a non-zero vector x that
has xTQ(Mk)x = 0. Because the matrix T is positive definite, it inverse matrix is also positive
definite. We then rewrite xTQ(Mk)x as:
xTQ(Mk)x = x
TT−1x+
N∑
i=Mk+1
bix
2
i ≥ x
TT−1x > 0.
for any non-zero vector x.
Lemma 4: The set of capacity-insufficient primary users in the k− 1th step is a subset of that in
the kth step.
Proof: Denote Mk and {Mk} to be the number and the set of capacity-insufficient primary users
in the kth search respectively. Denote p
(k)
i to be the price of primary user i in the k
th search. At
the beginning, M0 is equal to 0.
In the first search, there must have M1 > 0. Otherwise, all the primary users have sufficient
capacities. Without loss of generality, we look at the the kth search result.
The kth search is based on a priori knowledge that the primary users in the set {Mk−1} are
capacity-insufficient. We assume that the kth search finds out Mk capacity-insufficient primary
users. Hence, the newly found primary users satisfy
ai +
∑
j 6=i cijp
(k)
j
2
> qai , ∀i =Mk−1 + 1, · · · ,Mk. (89)
Because the price strategy of the ith new capacity-insufficient PU is
ai+
P
j 6=i cijp
(k)
j
2bi
, the above
equality is equivalent to bip
(k)
i > q
a
i .
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Next, we compare the price vector of the kth and the k − 1th searches. According to Eqn.(34), an
alternative form of price difference is expressed as
Q(Mk)p
(k) −Q(Mk−1)p
(k−1)
= Q(Mk−1) · (p
(k) − p(k−1))−


0
bMk−1+1p
(k)
Mk−1+1
...
bMkp
(k)
Mk
0


= −


0
qaMk−1+1
...
qaMk
0

 (90)
Submit the conditions bki q
(k)
i > q
a
i for all i =Mk−1 + 1, · · · ,Mk to the above equation, we obtain
Q(Mk−1) · (p
(k) − p(k−1)) > 0. (91)
Because Q(Mk−1) is a Stieltjes matrix, it is inverse nonnegative. Therefore, all elements in the
vector p(k) − p(k−1) are nonnegative. This means that the prices of all primary users do not de-
crease in each search. For the primary users in the set Mk−1, their optimal spectrum demands
are
ai+
P
j 6=i cijp
(k)
j
2 , which is also nondecreasing. To sum up, when a primary user is found to be
capacity-insufficient in the k − 1th round, it still lacks of capacity in the next search.
Theorem 2: Consider a type-I oligopoly spectrum market in Eqn.(5), there exists a unique Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof: We prove this theorem via two steps by contradiction. First, we will show that there exists
a unique NE if the capacity-insufficient PUs are unchangeable. In the second step, we prove that
the set of PUs that have insufficient capacities is unique in the oligopoly market.
As is mentioned earlier, a selfish PU decides the prices according to the rule Eqn.(32) if the
capacity is less than the best demand, and the rule Eqn.(33) otherwise. Provided a market with
N PUs, we can find that M of them are capacity-insufficient through the proposed search method.
The price vector at the NE, p∗, can be computed by
p∗ = [Q(M)]−1 · a(M),
where Q is a positive-definite matrix. Hence, when the set of capacity-insufficient PUs are deter-
mined, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium.
Next, we demonstrate that there has a unique set of capacity-insufficient primary users. The
primary users in the set N are grouped into four mutually exclusive classes: N1, N2, N3 and N4.
PUs in the sets N1 and N2 are capacity-insufficient in the iterative search (i.e. M = N1∪N2), but
the PUs in the sets N3 and N4 have enough capacities. The price vector at the NE is denoted as
p∗ = {p∗1, p
∗
2, · · · , p
∗
N}. At the NE, the PUs must have
ai +
∑
j 6=i ci,jp
∗
j
2
> qai ⇒ bip
∗
i > q
a
i ∀i ∈ N1; (92)
ai +
∑
j 6=i ci,jp
∗
j
2
> qai ⇒ bip
∗
i > q
a
i ∀i ∈ N2; (93)
ai +
∑
j 6=i ci,jp
∗
j
2
≤ qai ⇒ bip
∗
i ≤ q
a
i ∀i ∈ N3; (94)
ai +
∑
j 6=i ci,jp
∗
j
2
≤ qai ⇒ bip
∗
i ≤ q
a
i ∀i ∈ N4. (95)
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Assume that there exists a different set of PUs that are also capacity-insufficient. For general
purpose, we express this new set as N1 ∪ N3 and the capacity-sufficient set as N2 ∪ N4. Note
that the above PU sets can be empty, but has a union of N . Since there has a different set of
capacity-insufficient PUs, we can find another NE price vector p† that also have
ai +
∑
j 6=i ci,jp
†
j
2
> qai ⇒ bip
†
i > q
a
i ∀i ∈ N1; (96)
ai +
∑
j 6=i ci,jp
†
j
2
> qai ⇒ bip
†
i > q
a
i ∀i ∈ N3; (97)
ai +
∑
j 6=i ci,jp
†
j
2
≤ qai ⇒ bip
†
i ≤ q
a
i ∀i ∈ N2; (98)
ai +
∑
j 6=i ci,jp
†
j
2
≤ qai ⇒ bip
†
i ≤ q
a
i ∀i ∈ N4. (99)
Here, one can easily find there have p†i > p
∗
i for i ∈ N3 and p
∗
i > p
†
i for i ∈ N2. According to the
market model, the prices at the NE s can be expressed in terms of spectrum demands q∗i and q
†
i .
Then, p†i and p
∗
i in the sets N2 and N4 are written by,
p∗i =αi − (βi − µ)q
a
i − µ
∑
j∈N1
qaj − µ
∑
j∈N2
qaj − µ
∑
j∈N3
q∗j − µ
∑
j∈N4
q∗j , ∀i ∈ N2; (100)
p∗i =αi − (βi − µ)q
∗
i − µ
∑
j∈N1
qaj − µ
∑
j∈N2
qaj − µ
∑
j∈N3
q∗j − µ
∑
j∈N4
q∗j , ∀i ∈ N3; (101)
p†i=αi − (βi − µ)q
†
i − µ
∑
j∈N1
qaj − µ
∑
j∈N2
q†j − µ
∑
j∈N3
qaj − µ
∑
j∈N4
q†j , ∀i ∈ N2; (102)
p†i=αi − (βi − µ)q
a
i − µ
∑
j∈N1
qaj − µ
∑
j∈N2
q†j − µ
∑
j∈N3
qaj − µ
∑
j∈N4
q†j , ∀i ∈ N3. (103)
Recall that the conditions in Eqn.(93),(94),(97) and (98) present the results: p†i > p
∗
i for i ∈ N3
and p∗i > p
†
i for i ∈ N2. Hence, we have the following inequality
p∗i + p
†
l > p
†
i + p
∗
l ∀i ∈ N2, l ∈ N3. (104)
Submit Eqn.(100)-(103) to Eqn.(104) and cancel out the common items, we obtain the inequality
(βi − µ)q
†
i + (βl − µ)q
∗
i > (βi − µ)q
a
i + (βl − µ)q
a
l ∀i ∈ N2, l ∈ N3. (105)
Obviously, the above inequality is not true provided the market conditions βi > µ for i ∈ N . Thus,
there is a unique set of capacity-insufficient primary users, resulting in a unique Nash Equilibrium
in the oligopoly spectrum game.
Theorem 4: The QoSBEST algorithm converges to the unique NE if the market parameters are
positive as well as b1 > c > 0 and b2 > c > 0.
Proof: Assume the NE prices of PU1 and PU2 are p∗1 and p
∗
2. We start from time t and solve
the equation in Eqn.(83). Although p1(t + 1) in Eqn.(83) has two roots, one can easily check
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their feasibility by submitting these roots to the equation q1(t) = a1 − b1p1(t+ 1) + cp2(t). After
excluding the infeasible root, the unique price of PU1 is expressed as
p1(t+ 1) =
(3a1 + 3cp2(t)− 2q
a
1) +
√
(a1 + cp2(t)− 2qa1)
2 + 8b1θ
4b1
,
and the optimal price of PU1 is written as
p∗1 =
(3a1 + 3cp
∗
2 − 2q
a
1) +
√
(a1 + cp∗2 − 2q
a
1)
2 + 8b1θ
4b1
,
In order to compare p1(t+ 1) and p
∗
1, we consider four cases with regard to different p2(t) and p
∗
2.
Case 1: a1 + cp2(t)− 2q
a
1 ≥ 0 and a1 + cp
∗
2 − 2q
a
1 ≥ 0;
The difference between p1(t+ 1) and p
∗
1 is,
p1(t+ 1)− p
∗
1 =
3c(p2(t)− p
∗
2)
4b1
+
√
(a1 + cp2(t)− 2qa1)
2 + 8b1θ −
√
(a1 + cp∗2 − 2q
a
1)
2 + 8b1θ
4b1
.
If p2(t) ≥ p
∗
2, there has a1+cp2(t)−2q
a
1 > a1+cp
∗
2−2q
a
1 > 0. According to Lemma 5, the following
inequality holds,
p1(t+ 1)− p
∗
1 ≤
c(p2(t)− p
∗
2)
b1
. (106)
On the other hand, if p2(t) < p
∗
2, there has 0 < a1+cp2(t)−2q
a
1 < a1+cp
∗
2−2q
a
1 . Based on Lemma
5, we can obtain the following inequality,
p1(t+ 1)− p
∗
1 >
c(p2(t)− p
∗
2)
b1
. (107)
Combine Eqn.(106) and (107) together, we have,
|p1(t+ 1)− p
∗
1| ≤
c
b1
|p2(t)− p
∗
2|. (108)
Case 2: a1 + cp2(t)− 2q
a
1 < 0 and a1 + cp
∗
2 − 2q
a
1 < 0;
If p2(t) ≤ p
∗
2, there has 0 < 2q
a
1 − (a1 + cp
∗
2) ≤ 2q
a
1 − (a1 + cp2(t)). Similarly, we calculate the
difference between p1(t+ 1) and p
∗
1,
3c(p2(t)− p
∗
2)
4b1
≤ p1(t+ 1)− p
∗
1 ≤
c(p2(t)− p
∗
2)
2b1
. (109)
Otherwise, if p2(t) > p
∗
2, the difference between p1(t+ 1) and p
∗
1 satisfies,
c(p2(t)− p
∗
2)
2b1
≤ p1(t+ 1)− p
∗
1 ≤
3c(p2(t)− p
∗
2)
4b1
. (110)
The above analysis manifests that the following inequalities hold,
c
2b1
|p2(t)− p
∗
2| ≤ |p1(t+ 1)− p
∗
1| ≤
3c
4b1
|p2(t)− p
∗
2|. (111)
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Case 3: a1 + cp2(t)− 2q
a
1 ≥ 0 and a1 + cp
∗
2 − 2q
a
1 < 0;
The case 3 also implies p2(t) ≥ p
∗
2. According to Lemma 5, the following inequalities hold,
− c(p2(t)− p
∗
2) ≤
√
(a1 + cp2(t)− 2qa1)
2 + 8b1θ −
√
(2qa1 − (a1 + cp
∗
2))
2 + 8b1θ ≤ c(p2(t)− p
∗
2).
Therefore, the difference between p1(t+ 1) and p
∗
1 satisfies,
c
2b1
|p2(t)− p
∗
2| ≤ |p1(t+ 1)− p
∗
1| ≤
c
b1
|p2(t)− p
∗
2|. (112)
Case 4: a1 + cp2(t)− 2q
a
1 < 0 and a1 + cp
∗
2 − 2q
a
1 ≥ 0;
This case implies p2(t) ≤ p
∗
2. Using the similar method as that in Case 3, we obtain the same
inequality in (112). Combine all the analytic results together, we can see the distance between
p1(t + 1) and p
∗
1 has |p1(t + 1) − p
∗
1| ≤
c
b1
|p2(t) − p
∗
2|. Using the similar steps, we can easily find
that in slot (t+ 1), the following inequality holds,
|p2(t+ 2)− p
∗
2| ≤
c
b2
|p1(t+ 1)− p
∗
1| ≤
c2
b1b2
|p2(t)− p
∗
2| ≤ (
c2
b1b2
)
t
2 |p2(0) − p
∗
2|, (113)
where p2(0) is the initial price of PU2. Given the conditions b1 > c and b2 > c, the QoSBEST
algorithm converges to the unique NE.
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